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In the shadow of the imperialist project against the heart of the Muslim world, the causes of ethnic and sectarian frictions, as well as the mechanisms for their resolution, have been dragged into a wider, more complex political dynamic. Over the past decade, we have witnessed sectarian tensions, in one form or another, encumbering nations and peoples spanning from the westernmost point of the Sahara to the southern tip of continental Eurasia. The extent to which the rise of this phenomenon is an outcome of the imperialist project is entirely overlooked in western analysis. Instead, focus is laid squarely on 'indigenous factors' and so-called 'historical motivations' that are buried somewhere deep in history's endless bosom.
In essence, the sectarian phenomenon is a smokescreen; a myth of sorts, that is amplified and propagated in order to conveniently merge with the political objectives of stakeholders who neither have qualms with 'playing dirty', nor have any moral issues against plastering the '(un/intended) collateral damage' label wherever and whenever possible. [1]
Through its financial backing and institutional propagation of Wahhabism, Saudi Arabia (a key US ally) has played a critical role in fomenting sectarian strife. For a sect whose early beginnings are peppered with tales of overwhelming victories that involved the ransacking and desecration of some of the most sacred sites in Islam, it is not hard to grasp the special utility that Wahhabism affords as a medium to provoke inter-sectarian tensions. Indeed, the fashionable practise of takfir (labelling fellow Muslims as infidels) in recent times has its roots in the hostile and exclusionary outlook of the Wahhabi school of thought. [2]
One of the principal manifestations of this trademark hostility is found in the severe condemnations and juridical verdicts issued by Wahhabi scholars against mourning ceremonies for the grandson of the Holy Prophet, Imam Hussain, as well as celebrations held to mark the birth of the Holy Prophet. Whilst there is wide-scale state repression to prevent such gatherings in Saudi Arabia and nearby Gulf states such as Kuwait and the UAE, the level of repression is arguably far worse in countries outside the Middle East where Wahhabism has gained a foothold – as the dominant religious current – either in the national or sub-national contexts. For instance, it has become customary for mourning gatherings and processions in Pakistan to be the target of deadly attacks; particularly in the north-western FATA and NWFP provinces, resulting in the deaths of tens, if not hundreds, each year.
In connection, on the night of 15th December last year, security forces from the Selangor Islamic Affairs Department (JAIS) in Malaysia raided a Shi'ite centre and arrested at least 128 of those in attendance; the gathering was commemorating the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet of Islam. Some of those arrested are being held under the infernal Internal Security Act (ISA) which allows for the detention of an individual without trial or criminal charges under the pretext of national security. Other charges include violation of Article 12(c) of the Selangor Syariah Crimes Enactment 1995 which relates to conduct 'that is in contempt of the rightful authorities, or defies, violates or questions an order or directive that ... the mufti has stated or issued through a fatwa.' Rather conveniently, a fatwa issued in Selangor province prohibits being involved in, learning or propagating Shi'ite teachings. In simpler terms, there is to be no place for Shi'ites – as a religious denomination – in Malaysia.
Subsequent to the December raid, the extent of vitriolic abuse against Shi'ites in the national press has often bordered on outright lunacy. Take for instance, the suggestion by Mohamad Rais Rasid, JAIS deputy director for enforcement, to build a detention centre especially for followers of deviant Islamic teachings – in other words, Shi'ites:
"They must not be allowed to share cell rooms with other detainees because we are worried that this group would affect the faith of others ... Let them be confined together among themselves ... If we don't have such detention centres, we will have a dilemma." [3]
Far from being a one-off anomaly, the above mentality is in fact illustrative of the attitude of JAIS towards the country's Shi'ite citizens. On the heels of the December raid, the rector of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), Dr. Syed Arabi, signed a memorandum of understanding with his counterpart from the Islamic University of Medina (located in Saudi Arabia) on the need to prevent students from getting involved with Shi'ites; a clear indicator of the pervasive influence of the Saudi Kingdom on the religious infrastructure in Malaysia. [4]
It is interesting to note that US Secretary of State, Ms. Hillary Clinton, was an invited guest at IIUM in early November last year. The rectors of the respective institutions evidently had no problems offering a platform to the secretary of state of an imperial state that is overtly engaged in unjust wars against two fellow Muslim nations, but they regarded it imperative to urgently set-up an MoU to ensure that no students encounter Shi'ite teachings – speaks volumes!
On their part, the demands of Malaysia's Shi'ite population have been very straight-forward. Community leader, Kamil Zuhairi Abdul Aziz, asked: "If other communities like Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, Sikhs and others have their right to worship and practice under the constitution, then why not us?" [5] In a dire attempt to address the violation of their rights, the country's Shi'ites have made a plea to the Malaysian Human Rights Commission (Suhakam). Those arrested in the raid are expected to attend a court hearing on January 20. If found guilty, the punishments may range from 'six strokes' to 3 years in prison; those held under the ISA can, in theory, be held indefinitely without charge.
Beneath an ostensible veneer of sectarian motivations for the recent escalations in Selangor, the real issues relate to what are fundamentally the crude political interests of local and regional actors. Within this context, it is easy to overlook the pressing need to overhaul existent legal and constitutional mechanisms in countries such as Malaysia, which generate systemic discrimination on sectarian or other grounds. Lasting reforms cannot be achieved however, in the midst of friction and hostilities.
In conclusion, Saudi Arabia's role as patron of a global network of Wahhabist surrogate institutions on the one hand, and the kingdom's permanent presence within the orbit of US influence on the other, presents formidable challenges for leaders across the Muslim world who are striving for closer ties between various Islamic sects. Furthermore, the phenomenon of rising sectarianism overlaps with the wider imperialist project which is both contingent on, and thrives within, a climate of regional instability and tension. In this regard, bodies such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) must begin to take decisive stances if they indeed seek to 'safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world'.
At another level, governments that acquiesce to the Wahhabist, Saudi project must realise sooner rather than later, that it is impossible to reconcile the promotion of a nation's image on the regional and world scenes as brotherly and democratic, whilst the most basic human rights are not merely trampled upon, but very explicitly abused by functionaries of the state. Additionally, leading figures in such states would do well to observe patterns of correlation between the promotion of Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi doctrine and the growth of extremism. In this respect, the disastrous project undertaken by Pakistani General Zia Ul-Haq in the late Seventies and Eighties that has turned political and civil life in the country into an unrelenting nightmare is a case in point.
For seekers of justice, the overriding responsibility at the present time is to stand in solidarity with the oppressed in Malaysia and elsewhere around the world where the imperialist project continues to bring untold suffering to the lives of millions on a daily basis. Organisations such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) have urged the general public to partake in a mass letter-writing campaign aimed at pressuring the Malaysian government to ensure the safety and welfare of all its citizens. [6] As a final word of caution: it is absolutely crucial that religious leaders and the Muslim masses in general, do not resort to a 'sectarian discourse' in reaction to such instances of oppression, because that is the precise end sought by imperial powers and their regional proxies.
Notes:
1. 'The Myth of Sectarianism in the "New Middle East"', Global Research, 27 April 2009
2. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay' (2002) by Professor Hamid Algar, Islamic Publications International
3. 'Jais Moots Special Detention Camp for Deviationists', Malaysiakini, 24 December 2010
4. 'No Shi'ite Islam in IIUM, says rector', The Malaysian Insider, 30 December 2010
5. 'Shiites Demand Rights of Worship in Malaysia', Jakarta Globe, 28 December 2010
6. 'Action Alert: Malaysia – Raid on Ashura gathering', Islamic Human Rights Commission, 17 December 2010
Written by Ali Jawwad (Source)
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